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Abstract 
This paper examines the theory and practice of American foreign policy and how Nigeria, 
from the lens of the author perceives it. The paper establishes that Nigeria’s perception of 
the US and its role conceptions in the world is a combination of awe, admiration and 
envy: there are similarities in the national character of the two nations; and the “African 
giant” aspires to become a global power in the future and considers the American 
standards as its benchmark for that. The experience and impressions of the author before, 
during and after a recent Fulbright Fellowship at the Walker Institute/Department of 
Political Science of the University of South Carolina are freely used to evaluate the real 
import of American actions in the global system. The paper submits that US behavior in 
the world is, because of certain carelessness on the part of the nation, understood to be 
altruistic, overbearing, and yet discriminatory. It thus recommends, among other things, 
that the American nation requires much soft landing after Iraq and image damage control 
for the country to regain the confidence of the world. The method of analysis is 
descriptive and analytical, and the data are largely drawn from participation-observation 
and some secondary literature.  
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Introduction 
Nigeria has a high opinion of the United States of America (US). Nigeria has respect for 
the US part because of the latter’s high level of economic, military and technological 
development and as a result of its stable democracy, economic prosperity, unrivaled 
successes in the global system and of course its superpower capacity. Incidentally Nigeria 
itself aspires for these same attributes and achievements at home, at the regional, 
continental and global levels (Akinterinwa, 2001; King, 1996; Okon, 1998), which have 
partly informed its role perceptions, conceptions, and actual roles performed in the 
African continent since independence (Folarin, 2010). Thus Nigeria’s disposition toward 
America is a combination of awe, admiration and envy. More importantly Nigeria and the 
US share some national characteristics and moreover America is the greatest buyer of 
Nigeria’s crude. Among the common features are religious and ethnic plurality, 
federalism, presidentialism, and a huge population. 
 
The US too considers Nigeria geostrategically important in its African policy. As the 
most populous black nation in the world that has played pertinent roles in African 
development and integration, Nigeria naturally commands respect and influence that 
offer hopes to get Africa and the black world on America’s side. Also because of its size 
Nigeria offers a huge market. Again its very good Bonny Light oil is highly prized by the 
American nation. Moreover, in fighting international crime, fraud, narcotics and conflicts 
in Africa, the US considers Nigeria as a great partner. Aside these Nigeria has over the 
years enjoyed enormous technical, material and economic assistance from the US (Ate, 
2000: 173-180).  
 
It is not surprising therefore that Nigeria and the US enjoy a robust relationship. There 
have been strains and stresses in the relations, the most recent being the attempted 
terrorist bombing during Christmas of 2009 of a passenger plane in Detroit by a 23 year-
old Nigeria-born Britain-based Omar Farouk Abdumutallab; but these are not significant 
enough to write off the landmarks that earned the two countries mutual respect. However, 
the problematic is not the focus of this piece. The paper focuses on how Nigeria sees the 
US role conceptions and actual roles in the world, particularly its African policy. The 
paper critically examines the US foreign policy by two prisms: as a Nigerian and how 
Nigeria officially sees it; and as a visiting fellow in the US with first hand information 
and experience of US foreign policy. The paper particularly addresses the following: 
Nigeria’s official position informed by the opinion and impressions of Nigerians on US 
policy in the world, the character of US-Nigeria relations, and personal impressions of 
US global roles and foreign policy before coming as a fellow, and new impressions after 
the fellowship and recommendations. 
 
 
National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy: Conceptual/Theoretical Framework 
National role conceptions (NRCs) refer to a set of identified roles or tasks a state has set 
out for itself to play in the international system, which is supposed to be in tandem with 
its national interest. They are the articulation of a definite course of action to be 
undertaken in the external environment of a state put together by policymakers in the 
pursuit of foreign policy (Holsti, 1967), and which are informed by a number of factors 
of which the most critical are perceptions of national leaders, interpretations of the same 
policymakers, and the expectations of both the domestic and international publics 
(Folarin, 2010; Adigbuo, 2005; Wish, 1980).  
 
The understanding of states as organic actors with legitimate roles to occupy in the 
massive “social club” or international community, ascribes to the state a human attribute, 
allows for the predictability of state behavior in any given situation, and gives every state 
its own distinct image. Hence, the “national role theory” becomes a more attractive 
instrument of analysis than hitherto known analytical frameworks as political realism, 
national interest, and liberal-idealism, among others. The national role theory, adapted 
from ‘role theory’ in Social Psychology, in which leading lights such as Biddle ( ) 
espouse the inevitability of persons and their specific roles (concordant or discordant) in 
social groups, enhances the understanding that states have role types depending on their 
ideology, political experience, historical heritage, philosophical foundation, socio-
economic strengths, leadership quality, people’s choices; and the manifestations of role 
conflict and role strain in a complex international system. 
 
Nigeria and the US are major players in their own rights. Nigeria’s African policy is 
driven by role conceptions beginning from the eve of independence when its founding 
fathers identified the definitive “manifest destiny” of Nigeria to provide positive 
leadership for Africa against the backdrop of national cultural, economic, geo-strategic, 
mineral, military and demographical endowments. Nigeria’s role conceptions are clouded 
by leaders’ perceptions, preferences and interpretations which overshadow the 
expectations of the citizens or involve their inputs and opinions (Folarin, 2010: 224-365). 
The American foreign policy is also role conception-driven, with the enormous natural 
and invented power of the American nation engendering an exceptionalist principle that 
has always shaped its foreign policy. The politics of role conception is however, not too 
different from that of Nigeria’s, as it is also characterized by clique clannishness and 
elitism (Rosati, 2006). The national role theory is an appropriate framework to explain 
Nigeria’s perception of US foreign policy, and for the understanding of the peculiar 
character and attitude of the two nations in international politics.  
  
Nigeria and the US: Similarities of Statehood 
Nigeria shares a number of national attributes with the US. First both are former colonies 
of Great Britain with similar colonial experience that prompted a passionate commitment 
to anti-colonial movement during and after colonization (Obi, 2000, Alstyne, 1960). 
Second both countries conceived ambitious national roles and assumed shortly after 
independence a role of protecting their continent and fighting the cause of development 
and integration, which is sometimes misunderstood as attempt to establish hegemony 
over other states. However, this proactive attitude translated into action has naturally 
placed both countries in a leadership position. Third Nigeria and the US are multinational 
states. While America has almost the whole of the races and ethnic nationalities in the 
world represented as citizens in the US, Nigeria is a country of 140 million people with 
250 ethnic nationalities. The socio-ethnic composition of the two states has significantly 
reflected in the foreign policies of both countries. It is pertinent to note that in the case of 
Nigeria elements of some of the ethnic groups like Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani and Ejagham 
can also be found in neighboring countries such as Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon 
respectively; and in far away countries as Brazil and Cuba. As such Nigeria has a policy 
of good neighborliness embedded in the first of its foreign policy concentric circles 
(Bukarambe, 2000, Saliu, 1999 Akinyemi, 2005), and maintains a seamless relationship 
with Brazil and other nations which, by the fortune of the Atlantic slave trade, found 
Nigerian elements ferried to the “New World”. 
 
Fourth, Nigeria is a multifaith society like the US. The major religions in Nigeria include 
Christianity, Islam, and Animism. However, each religion is made up of numerous 
denominations and tens of sects, which has made the religious environment enormously 
charged and intensely competitive (Marshall, 1993). The intense religious atmosphere 
probably accounts for the recent rating of Nigeria and the US as two of world’s most 
religious countries (Nigerian Tribune, April 15 2007:1). 
 
Fifth the political structure of Nigeria is federal like that of the US’. Nigeria is made up 
of 36 states and Abuja as the Federal Capital Territory just as Washington D.C. is US’ 
capital. There is a three-tier system with the local government as the least and grassroots 
government. The implication of this is that power is properly distributed in such a way 
that the center or federal government can have more time devoted to the demands of 
foreign policy making and implementation. Similarly both America and Nigeria practice 
the presidential system of government in which the Chief Executive or President has the 
prevalent grounds in foreign policy issues (Rosati, 2007, Fawole, 2004). 
 
Again the two countries have a long-range policy objective of becoming or remaining a 
superpower. While the US has been a superpower for sixty three years and is probably 
the only superpower in a new world order, Nigeria has a long way to go in sustaining its 
continental leadership and becoming a global power. Nigeria’s leaders from 
independence have however not minced words in affirming the ambitious policy. One 
time Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Olu Adeniji affirms: 
With the reduction of the strategic and ideological interests of the major powers in the 
developing countries, regional peace and security issues as well as regional economic 
and social development will become essentially the task of countries in the region.                
In an eventual multi-polar world, the role of regional powers will become more vital 
and Nigeria must seek to remain one of the major powers, if not the major power from 
Africa (2000:21-22). 
 
Also both countries are big democracies although Nigeria’s democratic experience is 
experimental, nascent and stabilizing with lots of lessons, inspiration and assistance 
drawn from the US. Moreover oil is another thing that brings both countries together. The 
US is a small producer of oil, while Nigeria is world’s sixth largest producer of oil. Both 
need each other, one as the indispensable seller and the other as the biggest buyer of oil. 
 
The similarities of national character and the issues that bring the two countries together 
identified above have bonded Nigeria and US and made the former to be full of hope that 
its aspiration to become a power of global reckoning would see the light of the day 
someday. Indeed Nigeria and its people see themselves as the ‘USA of Africa’ and a 
potential world power given its enormous human, material and natural resources. 
 
Nigeria-US Relations 
There are four main underlying factors in Nigeria-US relations namely, mutual respect 
and interdependence, oil, democracy and development assistance. There are two schools 
of thought across scholarship in terms of assistance from the US. A school of thought 
from Nigeria led by Aka (2005) argues that development cannot come through external 
assistance but from within a nation. The school argues that what results from any so 
called development-oriented assistance from the US or Industrialized North can only 
create structural imbalances in the relationship with the developing world. 
 
However, the second school finds expression in the argument of Stephen Ellis in “How to 
Rebuild Africa” (2005) and another American scholar Robert Kagan in “The Benevolent 
Empire” (1998), both of whom stress the unique place of American assistance for “a vast 
portion of the world’s population.”  The external support thesis is enhanced by some 
thinking in leadership quarters that foreign support reinforces rather than detracts or 
compromises self-development. According to this view, countries have ultimate 
ownership and responsibility for their own self-development, but external assistance is 
not necessarily contrary to this goal. As former President Obasanjo argued during a 
spring 2001 interview, although Nigerian democracy “is essentially our own,” 
“development partners” such as the United States can contribute to bringing about the 
“democracy dividend” that will make Nigerian democracy more firm. Obasanjo 
characterized the “democracy dividend” as an opportunity for “getting resources to deal 
with essential quality of life enhancement in our own society . . . .” (Cited in Aka, 2005). 
This definition connotes the usefulness of external support given that, as is often the case 
in Africa, the resources needed to enhance quality of life cannot be entirely generated at 
home. 
 
The tradition of American foreign policy encompasses both moral idealism and raw self-
interests (Love, 2007; Holsti and Rosenau, 1988; Thompson, 1968). However, it is 
important to stress that American policy makers believe that pragmatism more than either 
idealism or realism characterizes their foreign policy. In otherwords, they consider what 
is most practicable per time in taking decisions or action on issues of international 
concern. One important issue about Nigeria that America considers expedient to 
intervene in and assist the former on is democratization. From 1993 to date, America has 
supported the move for a more democratically stable Nigeria with the belief that the 
success of Nigeria’s experience will enhance the democratization process in Africa (Ate, 
2000:144). 
 
The US’ primary economic interest in Nigeria is oil. As a voracious consumer of the 
country’s low-sulfur petroleum, America recognizes Nigeria’s worth as the largest fine 
oil producer in Africa and the sixth largest in the OPEC. Since 1974 Nigeria has been one 
of the largest exporters of crude oil to the United States. Nigeria sells 40% of its oil to the 
States. Nigeria’s crude oil exports as well as related products make up about 10% of total 
annual US oil imports. Other Nigerian products to the US market are timber, rubber, 
hides and skin and textiles (Ate, 2005: 143). Securing the US’ supply of Nigerian oil was 
one of the bases for then-Vice President George Bush’s visit to Nigeria in 1982. 
American companies such as Shell, Exxon Mobil, and Chevron have substantial 
investments in the lucrative Nigerian oil industry, which, along with other Western oil 
companies, they dominate. However, the recent growing insecurity in the oil producing 
Niger Delta is a major concern to the US. Apart from the fact that the enormous oil 
interests of the US there are threatened by the activities of the militant organizations who 
engage in acts of violence like abduction and killing of expatriates, and destruction of the 
oil facilities of the multinational companies, the security problems of the Delta may 
defeat the object of making Nigeria and Africa safe for democracy and capitalist 
investment. 
 
Another of the United States’ interests in Nigeria is to maintain ties with the nation once 
described as “the most African country” in the world. Nigeria’s vast human and natural 
resources, though poorly managed, offer lots of promises for the US. The country also 
plays a leadership role in Africa, particularly in West Africa, that advances other U.S. 
interests. Under General Abacha, Nigeria led a peacekeeping mission as part of the 
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that helped 
to stabilize long-time U.S. allies Liberia and Sierra Leone. Paradoxically, Nigeria was 
able, through ECOMOG, to restore democracy in Liberia and to reinstate a sacked 
civilian president in Sierra Leone while leaving its own citizens under the darkness of 
military rule (Omach, 2000). Nigeria’s intervention in regional stability arguably 
contributes to the American goal of making the world safe for democracy. As former 
U.S. Secretary of State Albright noted, Nigeria is “potentially a very valuable partner for 
us in promoting peace, democracy, and the rule of law throughout West Africa” (Aka, 
2005: 8). 
 
A third U.S. interest is the maintenance of American cultural-historical linkages to 
Nigeria. A great number of Americans trace their roots to Africa. Many of those 
Americans, including entertainer-scholar Paul B. Robeson (1898–1976), trace those 
origins to Nigeria (Aka, 2005: 10). 
 
Also America needs Nigeria’s help in its campaign against international drugs/narcotics 
trafficking. The economic hardships in Nigeria, beginning in the 1980s, resulted in the 
emergence of a significant drug-dependent culture and in the conversion of Nigerian 
borders into a major route for the trafficking of cocaine and heroin into the United States. 
In its 1997 report on international drug trafficking, the State Department noted that 
“‘Nigeria is the hub of African narcotics trafficking, and Nigerian poly-crime 
organizations continue to expand their role in narcotics trafficking worldwide.” Nigeria-
U.S. cooperation on drug trafficking dates back to 1987 when the two countries signed a 
mutual law enforcement agreement followed by a special anti-drug Memorandum of 
Understanding. The US also looks to Nigeria to help reduce the number of American 
victims of advance fee fraudsters (419). According to an estimate, “Americans lose $2 
billion annually to white collar crime syndicates based in Nigeria” (Aka, 2005: 16). 
 
Nigeria’s primary interest in relating with the US is informed by the fact that it sees the 
US as a steady buyer of its oil. Although Nigeria’s share of the U.S. market has 
fluctuated over the years, the United States remains a primary purchaser of Nigerian 
crude oil. Second, as earlier mentioned Nigeria values the US because it draws 
inspiration from it as one of the most powerful countries in the world, and because the 
two countries share similar demographic features such as ethnic, economic, and religious 
complexities. Third, like many developing countries, Nigeria seeks to tap into American 
“technological capabilities” for its manpower development needs. Tens of thousands of 
Nigerians have flocked to the United States in search of higher education, and in more 
recent times for greener pastures. There has been the emigration of Nigeria’s intellectual 
manpower, political asylum seekers between 1993 and 1998 and victims of the violent 
ethnic conflict of recent years. 
 
Those Nigerians who come to America for education refuse to return to Nigeria because 
of the unfavorable political and economic conditions in their home country. These émigré 
Nigerian-Americans include Philip Emeagwali, whose mathematical genius President 
Clinton praised during his address to a joint assembly of the Nigerian National Assembly 
on August 26, 2000 (The Guardian, August 27 2000:1-2). Immigration policies such as 
the visa lottery compound this “brain drain” since many of the Nigerians who win these 
lotteries are educated individuals whose talents the country needs. As former Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State (African Affairs) Leonard H. Robinson Jr. noted on the eve 
of President Clinton’s 2000 visit to Nigeria, “one of the most important things the United 
States can do is to help the Obasanjo government reverse the trend that has sent the best 
and brightest Nigerians fleeing to the U.S. and elsewhere” (The Guardian, August 26 
2000:1). 
 
The mutuality of needs, respect, assistance to stabilize democracy in Nigeria so as to gain 
Africa for democracy, other forms of assistance, and oil, have decimated US-Nigeria 
relations for ages. It is important to state that these factors also underlie Nigeria’s official 
opinion of the US. Generally, America is held in high esteem by the Nigerian government 
except during the Sani Abacha regime when Nigeria was isolated for its full martial laws 
and unpopular domestic policies. However, mixed reactions from Nigeria sometimes 
meet America’s intervention and foreign policy in the world. 
 
State of the World and Role of the US 
The issues bogging down the global system in the last ten years include democracy, 
terrorism, national and regional security, ethnic and religious conflicts, child soldiering, 
poverty, narcotics, human trafficking, HIV-AIDS, environmental degradation, global 
warming, etc. Since the end of the Cold War democracy has become more embraced by 
nations of the world. Military dictatorship, monarchical absolutism and socialist tyranny 
collapsed in the face of popular clamor for representative government. Even in Africa, 
which had been the hub of military autocracy for three decades democracy became a 
fashionable system of government. 
 
Terrorism has from 1978 been a source of international concern, with the West being the 
most disturbed as it has been the major target. Terrorism took a more dangerous 
dimension from 1997 with the Lockerbie plane bombing by suspected Libya-sponsored 
terrorists. Other tragic incidents occurred, including the bombing of US embassies in 
some countries in the Horn of Africa and Asia, attacks on pubs and recreation centers in 
some parts of the world that had people of American and European extraction, and 
abduction of Americans and Europeans used as bargaining chips and to demand ransom. 
The international system witnessed a most unprecedented form of terrorism in 2001 by 
the attacks of the US on September 11. Suicide bombers flying hijacked passenger 
airliners ran into the World Trade Center in New York and The Pentagon in Washington 
D.C. wreaking the most devastating havoc in America’s national history. Terror became 
the most common means of fighting by the minority and acts of terror have been 
replicated through the Al-Qaeda network across the world, including Pakistan, Yemen, 
Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Algeria, and Somalia. 
 
Ethnic genocide and sectarian violence on domestic and international scale have also 
been another albatross to global peace order. The Rwandan genocide in 1994, which 
started as a minor ethno-political crisis in 1993 had been rooted in the Hutu-Tutsi 
animosity from independence arising from the divide and rule tactic of the Belgian 
colonialists. The Hutu ”Power” bloc because of advantaged population size had taken 
over from the Belgians in 1960 and soon commenced a hate campaign to dismember the 
Tutsi considered as Belgian collaborators during colonialism. Between 1962 and 1975, 
intermittent ethnic cleansing by the Hutu occurred but by 1994 it had degenerated to full 
scale genocide with over 800,000 people killed and more than a million persons displaced 
within just 100 days (Gerard, 1997). The Somalian crisis which occurred before the 
Rwandan conflict had opened a floodgate of ethnic genocides in Africa. Other cases were 
the Liberian crisis from 1990, Sierra Leonean conflict of the 1990s, Ivorian crisis from 
2004, Congo crisis from 1997, and Darfur (Sudan) genocide from 2003. For the Somalia 
crisis, barring the losses it considered “huge” the US played active role; however, for 
what it called fear of having another Somalia episode in its hands, the US looked away 
from the Rwandan genocide and did not play its traditional peace enforcement role to 
stop the tragedy. It is pertinent to note that the selective nature of American intervention 
in Africa has elicited racial slurs and popular opinions about America’s custom of 
keeping away from where it has little investments.   
 
In terms of religious conflict, Nigeria offers a critical example. Shortly after the 
“resolution” of the “June 12 1993” election crisis by the swearing-in in 1999 of a 
Christian president from the Southwestern Yoruba ethnic group, governors of the 
predominantly Moslem North orchestrated the establishment of the Islamic legal and 
moral code Sharia in their states one after the other meant to embarrass and destabilize 
the power at the center. The Islamic law ignored the principles governing the Christian 
community in the Northern states thus creating a major ethno-religious crisis. The whole 
of the North soon went up in flames with massive killing of Christians and arson 
unleashed upon the Christian community. There were reprisals in the Southern cities of 
Ibadan, Sagamu, Osogbo and Lagos that are predominantly Christian. Another theater of 
ethno-religious war has been Iraq. From the time of Saddam Hussein up till the 
intervention of America and allies in 1991 and the 2003 deposition of Hussein and 
invasion of Baghdad Sunnis and Shiites have been daggers-drawn while the South had 
carried out calculated extermination of Northern Kurds (Folarin, 1998). 
 
In very recent times the Kenya election crisis resulting in an explosive civil strife and 
negative economic implications for the Great Lakes region has attracted world attention. 
The erstwhile sedate Kenyan political environment with a booming tourist industry was 
thrown into a major quagmire by the rigging of the Presidential elections in December 
2006 to favor the incumbent Mwai Kibaki upstaging the leading candidate in the polls, 
Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement. The political crisis is already taking 
an ethnic dimension with the Kikuyu, Luo and Kallenji rallying around parties having 
their ethnic elements in their leadership (The Guardian, January 29 2008).         
 
It is pertinent to note that 90% of the concerns identified above emanate from developing 
countries that are struggling for stability, peace and economic leverage. This view is 
emphasized by Feinberg (1983) that since the years immediately after World War 11 the 
Third World has been the chief locus of international relations. 
 
It was this problematic situation in the developing world that Soviet Union and the US 
capitalized on to pursue their “ideological expansionist” policy, for as Feinberg contends 
      The United States and the Soviet Union, separated by forbidding distances and restrained by    
        the fear of mutual destruction, concentrated their competition in “third areas.”  With its    
        political instabilities and localized wars, the developing world has provided a fertile,   
        alternative battleground where the Great Powers could wage a shadow proxy war, where     
        each could seek to spread its own influence and deny or disrupt its opponent’s ambitions.   
        (1983:15). 
 
America’s interventionist policy is legendary. Leaders in the circles of Conservatives, 
Realists and Neo-Cons strongly hold that the nation has the role or obligation to 
safeguard the world for democracy, freedom and good governance. This American 
sentiment, reminiscent of the popular legendary movie character “Voltron” the Defender 
of the World, was once expressed by Kissinger when he lamented the eroding power of 
the nation viz:  
We are sliding toward a world of out of control, with our relative military power 
declining, with our economic lifeline increasingly vulnerable to blackmail, with hostile 
radical forces growing in every continent, and with the number of countries willing to 
stake their future on our friendship dwindling Kissinger (1980). 
 
After the Cold War, the US seemed to have the leeway to win the world for democracy. 
By the demise of Soviet Union and considerable shrinking of Soviet power, America 
emerged as the only superpower in the world. Thus, America had more roles to play in 
actualizing its long-range interest of securing the world for democracy and capitalism. 
The policy of containment hitherto characterizing its foreign policy would now give way 
to restructuring of the global political, economic and ideological systems. Incidentally, it 
was from this period that the new challenges earlier identified would constitute the 
foreign policy crises of the US. 
 Today, Obama’s Washington’s attention is directed toward the rumblings emanating 
from the Middle East (the rise of Iran as a Nuclear Power, the challenge of pulling out of 
Iraq, the complicated Afghan war, the proliferation of terror activities, the falling of 
Pakistan into Al-Qaeda’s hands), Central America (problem of Haiti, the Mexico drug 
war, the influx of Latinos into the US), Southern Africa (the problem of Robert Mugabe), 
the Horn of Africa (Sudan/Darfur conflict, Somalian crisis, election crisis in Kenya), 
West Africa (resurgence of military coups, Niger Delta crisis), Eastern Europe and 
Northeast Asia (challenge of North Korea). The US had resolved from the era of Reagan 
to enlarge its capacity to influence events and to make more effective use of the full range 
of its moral, political, scientific, economic, and military resources in the pursuit of its 
national interests; and to increase military spending in order to stiffen its resolve, 
augment its capabilities, and make its threats and blandishments more credible (Haig, 
1981). 
 
In the 1990s the resolve was made more manifest by the President Bush administration, 
Bush, a Neo-Con was Vice President to Reagan in the 80s. America played a major role 
in Saddam Hussein’s successes in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) as Hussein was 
considered a liberal Moslem that could check the excesses of the extremist Islamic 
leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran. Ironically, in 1991 America led the UN-backed 
allies in the Operation Desert Storm to force Saddam Hussein’s forces out of occupied 
Kuwait. After the war, the US commenced a full scale campaign on dismantling the 
vestiges of Soviet political and military traditions in Iraq and removal of Saddam 
Hussein. To justify this campaign it alleged that Iraq was producing outlawed weapons of 
mass destruction, which prompted a UN Inspection Team to be sponsored for 
investigation. After initial frustrations from the Iraqi authorities the UN team was 
allowed to investigate the allegations. The Bush administration also stopped the Hussein 
highhandedness in Kurd occupied Northern Iraq which it designated No Fly Zone for the 
Iraqi authorities because of alleged organized killings of the Kurds by the Sunni led 
administration (Stock, 1992, Onigbinde, 1998, Folarin, 1998). 
After Bush, President Clinton reverted to diplomacy like the Carter administration in the 
Middle East. However, in the heat of the Monica Lewinsky scandal in the White House, 
Clinton changed from diplomacy to war in Iraq in the mid 1990s re-enacting the 
bombardments that characterized the Bush era. There was a view then that the sudden 
militant disposition to the Gulf Region was to divert attention from the legitimacy crisis 
at home (Kagan, 1998). 
The terrorist attacks on the US of September 11 2001 were to change the whole concept 
and approach by the US to local and international security. Apart from tightening loose 
ends in the country including the establishment of the Homeland Security Department, 
intensifying of border and airport checks, and banning of certain items on flights; the US 
considered its future security inadequate in the face of global insecurity engendered by 
terrorism. Malken (2002) argues that the US by the lax in its immigration laws, had 
accommodated all manner of unscrutinized elements whose missions were never 
ascertained and as such had exposed itself to friends and foes and made itself vulnerable 
to terrorist attacks. Hence the President George W. Bush administration began to drive an 
aggressive policy aimed at securing the borders while still opening its doors; and became 
overly committed to fighting terror and securing the world (Moskowitz and Lantis, 2006). 
By this, the administration that initially had a policy of minimal internationalism was 
induced by 9/11 to come out full-blown into international politics. 9/11 earned America 
international sympathy, increased the President’s support base, made a hero of him, 
justified unilateral and sometimes arbitrary interventions internationally, and created an 
Imperial Presidency that assumed 90% political power with little recourse to 
constitutionalism (Rosati, 2007, Puchala, 2005). 
In fighting terrorism, the Bush administration identified Afghanistan’s Taleban regime as 
harboring Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda terrorist group that claimed responsibility 
for the 9/11 attacks. Other nations identified included Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Libya, 
Somalia, and a number of groups in several other countries, which were accused of 
belonging in the Al-Qaeda network (Clarke, 2004). The war in Afghanistan was intense 
and constituted the climax of what Bush had said two days after the attacks about 
“whether we bring them to justice or bring justice to them, justice must be done” 
(Folarin, 2004: 21, The Guardian, Sept 12, 2001: 1). The Taleban was sacked, Osama 
was sent into the “holes” and terrorism abated in the meantime. 
After Kabul, Bush resumed the old campaign to dethrone dictatorships that had the 
tendency to be terrorism friendly, particularly in the Middle East. Iraq came into the 
picture and by 2003 Baghdad and Saddam had been felled. The trial of Saddam went side 
by side with the war in Iraq. The consequence of the invasion of and protracted crisis in 
Iraq is the intense crisis of confidence for the United States as many nations of the world 
and the UN seem not to fully grasp the genuine intentions behind America’s huge 
military budget and occupation of Iraq. This is particularly more so because of the spate 
of violence and resort to suicide bombings in the country. According to some 
international public opinions, Iraq has become more disorganized, politically more 
distraught and anarchical than Bush met it (Packer, 2005). 
President Bush also declared Tehran and North Korea global security risks because of the 
possession and threat of development of nuclear capacity. The US also fears that Iran’s 
extremist religious leadership is potentially terror-friendly; hence the Bush campaign for 
global condemnation of the Iranian and Korean nuclear threats. 
In terms of conflict resolution the US has also been involved. America instigated the UN 
intervention in Liberia and led the peacekeeping troops in Somalia. Other places where 
America intervened unilaterally or jointly included Kosovo, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The case of Rwanda was a very sore point 
for America as it refused to intervene. Incidentally the Rwandan genocide turned out to 
be the worst genocide in human history. A school of thought suggests that Rwanda like 
some countries with high intensity conflict do not enjoy American intervention because 
they do not fall within the range of what Ripley and Lindsay (1993:18-22) call ”strategic 
policy”, but such nations may be within America’s “structural policy” which constitutes 
program of assistance for rebuilding crisis-ridden countries (Scott, 1996: 3). The failure 
to act in Rwanda brought much unpopularity to the US.  
Perception of US Roles in the World 
The general Nigerian perception of the United States and US foreign policy rubs on 
individual perception of the American foreign policy. Young men growing up with 
Hollywood movies particularly cowboy films, because there is the argument that every 
society tells its own story by its arts, got ideas that the American society could be violent. 
American epics and movies depicting heroism also demonstrate the extent to which, for 
the sake of saving one small group or just an individual, a detachment of American 
soldiers could sack a whole city, a big group or an entire nation. Hence most Nigerians 
grow up with the opinion that like the American thinking demonstrated in motion 
pictures, American foreign policy was “cowboy” like the roles of Reagan in the Iran-Iraq 
war, and Bush 1 and 11 in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated. Similarly, people 
sometimes ascribe the occupation of Iraq, or invasion of Vietnam in the past or summary 
destruction of whole groups as the American tendencies as depicted in their films to 
stretch the elastic ends of their hard power. 
Interestingly, ordinary citizens of Nigeria believe that the US is a paradise of sorts and 
uncritically accept the intervention of America anywhere in the world. They even express 
willingness to have the US intervene in any small national crisis in Nigeria and support 
the stationing of the proposed US Africom (African Command) in Nigeria. Such liberal 
minded people, who are about 65% of those whose expressed views of America were 
accessible, regard America as the Messiah in a world of anarchy and tens of millions of 
those who belong to this group dream of living in the States, working there and earning 
American citizenship. The group is a large one and is still growing. No wonder a survey 
done in 2007 seeking to know the level of confidence of peoples around the world in 
American internationalism shows that in Nigeria 65% believes so much that America 
takes into account interests of other countries in taking international decisions, while 28 
% respondents has little confidence in American policy. The percentage that has 
confidence in US foreign policy in Nigeria surpasses that of even America that has only 
59% (The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2007). 
However, the academia and media in Nigeria are often critical and suspicious of every 
American role in the world, particularly in Africa. Nigerian intellectuals and journalists 
often describe US’ presence in Iraq as a crude “invasion”, “occupation” and undue 
interference”. They reject American intervention in the domestic affairs of states 
including roles for democratization, development assistance and management of ethnic or 
religious crisis, arguing that they are internal problems that can best be handled by the 
locals who best understand them. Those who share the view argue that most of the 
regions/countries where America intervenes do not require such intervention and reliance 
on US aid would only lead to a compromise of national sovereignty and consolidation of 
subtle American imperialism in the process, which has intensified from the end of the 
Cold War. 
However one’s personal perception of the American society entirely changed during the 
Study of the United States Institute on American Foreign Policy Fellowship that took 
eighteen Fulbright Fellows from seventeen countries of the world to the Walker Institute 
of International and Area Studies (WIIAS), of the University of South Carolina. At the 
Walker Institute, Fellows engaged in a month-long intensive study of US foreign policy. 
After that, the rest of the program was devoted to visiting important cultural, political, 
economic, and national security points of interest, and interact intensively with the 
shapers, makers and implementers of American foreign policy in Washington DC and six 
other states of the US. Building on the foundation provided by the four-week residence, 
Fellows interacted with important governmental officials and non-governmental actors, 
visited governmental and private offices, and got to acquire a better sense of American 
culture. 
While gaining new, sharper and deeper insights and knowledge of US foreign policy, the 
special privileges to rub minds with 21 American scholars and foreign policy technocrats 
in The Pentagon, National Security Council, National Intelligence Committee, Capitol 
Hill, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), US Mission to the 
UN, Center for a New American Security, Department of State, Brookings Institution, US 
Army, etc., equipped the scholars with the knowledge of the real feeling of America 
about the world.  
Again the hospitality of Columbia (capital of the State of South Carolina) and the 
accessibility of its people with no sign of racial discrimination erased the “Nigerian 
opinion” earlier had that America was that legendary “wild, wild West” or a “cowboy” 
nation. Life moved much peaceably slowly in South Carolina like other places in the 
South, with the exception of “fast” Georgia, thus contrasting sharply with the impression 
created by the very ambitious and aggressively pursued US foreign policy that had given 
the erroneous impression that Americans were arrogant, imperialistic and unfriendly 
people.  
A personal understanding of the American presence in Iraq is that the original motive was 
to rescue the nation from state terror and ethno-religious oppression, but that the motive 
soon paled into oblivion and became consumed in the war-plan of an overexcited camp of 
the Neo-Cons whose roadmap of occupation ignored acceptability by the Iraqis and a 
rational timeframe. Hence, the good plans of Mr. Bush are misunderstood because they 
were probably hijacked and certainly mis-implemented. This explains the huge military 
and administrative spending, and the crossroads in Iraq. 
Recommendations 
The controversy surrounding the United States policy in the Middle East imposes a huge 
responsibility on America to convince the greater part of the world about its genuine 
intentions in the universe. While the SUSI Fellows have had the special privileges to 
know what America really is and that they have a good disposition to the world, the 
majority that is ignorant of this fact still believes that the nation is just an over-ambitious 
and arrogant one that is interested in safeguarding the world only to fester its own 
economic and political nests and keep it bound to the ideology of capitalist democracy. 
With the “Iraqigate” and other controversial foreign policies America needs lots of image 
laundering to earn back the confidence of not only its many friends in Nigeria and 
elsewhere in the world, not only its increasing camp of enemies, but also that of 
Americans whose cynicism towards US foreign policy is growing. 
Second, America needs to be able to urgently answer the question of what its fate is in 
Iraq, and what would become of that country after their exit, and in the face of growing 
suicide bombing, and religious violence. There are five difficult options the US now has: 
immediate withdrawal, phased withdrawal, total withdrawal, partial withdrawal, no 
withdrawal. An immediate withdrawal has its own side-effect of Iraqi civil war 
immediately America withdraws. A phased withdrawal portends a grave danger of 
deepening of the terrorism and sectarian violence because of likely America’s prolonged 
stay. The fifth, no withdrawal is an obvious explosive that will explode upon both Iraq 
and America sooner or later. I posed this pertinent question before top American foreign 
policy bureaucrats at the NSC, Pentagon, and to then US Ambassador to the UN, and 
member of Congress,  Joe Wilson. Ambassador Khalilzad had a brilliant suggestion: 
urgently calling all stakeholders in the crisis together to a roundtable and putting it across 
to them what exactly they desire in the immediate and in future. Their own 
recommendation represents their own desire, which will douse tension and possibly 
engender ceasefire, and which would ultimately be what America would do. 
America’s non-intervention in Rwanda is yet unforgotten. Many Africans still think that 
if Rwanda were in Europe or Middle East or were at least an oil-producing area, America 
would have probably swiftly responded to stop the genocide that ended up in 800,000 
deaths. The US had rationalized its non-intervention by the Somalian experience in which 
US lost many of its troops to Somalian rebels and militia groups. After the Rwandan 
problem, President Clinton had later apologized and promised “Never Again” to allow 
such scale of murder occur in human history. However, Africa felt disappointed that as 
Liberia boiled from 1990 through 1994 to late 1990s and as Sierra Leone experienced 
civil strife caused by the “blood diamond” in which the West played significant role to 
save their investment in the diamond trade and destabilization of the growing democracy, 
the United States government barely showed interest. Also, the mere verbal engagement 
and warning to military interventionists in Nigeria during the June 12 election crisis, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Togo, Ivory Coast, and Darfur (Sudan) without 
concrete action, remind Africans of Rwanda and seeming contradiction in the US’ 
avowed commitment to stabilizing emerging democracies. To redress this, the US should 
no longer appear selective in intervening in crisis areas. US would not be countermanding 
the universal principle of non-interference if the cause is to save humanity. 
In order not to be seen as curbing crisis somewhere and creating it elsewhere, the US 
should thread softly in the Somalia-Eritrea crisis. America should not be seen as taking 
sides with one country against another, particularly in a poverty-ridden and crisis-torn 
continent of Africa. Rather than use one country as a base to strike another like in the 
case of Eritrea and Somalia, thus appearing to be killing a fly with a sledgehammer, the 
US can bring permanent solution to the crisis and make its positive economic presence 
felt in Somalia in such a way that the economically frustrated people of Somalia would 
not become the ready tools in the hands of Al-Qaeda. 
On the issue of Africom, the US would have to position the minds of Africans properly to 
accept this. Enlightened people of the continent understand that Africom is not a 
reincarnation of the colonial forces of occupation; they however are apprehensive of the 
tendencies to become a subtle tool of monitoring and compelling African nations to do 
America’s bidding. US-Africom is probably supposed to be a standby force for rapid 
response to crisis in African nations to avoid a situation in which slow response would 
again compel reasoning that America is unconcerned about African problems. This must 
however be made intelligible to ordinary Africans who have lost faith in Western 
intervention. 
Lastly, part of the problem of US policy toward Africa is that the continent, despite its 
huge geographical and demographic size, is seen as just one “nation”. Thus the many 
economic, social and political problems are genuinely largely unknown. Just like the US 
relates with some countries like China, India, Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, France, 
Holland, Britain as individual units, African countries should not be lumped together into 
one single unit. It is true that this would impose huge burdens on America, but it is also 
true that the problems of Africa are too enormous to be ignored; particularly when 
cognizance is taken of the fact that the same continent has been a land of opportunities 
from which many Western nations are benefiting. 
Conclusion 
American foreign policy in the world is in the last five years misunderstood. There is the 
accusation about the occupation of Iraq and treatment with impunity of perceived friends 
of terror. It is also true that the US pursues its national interest with all resources at its 
disposal including military means; but that is same for all other nations of the world 
because international politics itself is the struggle for power (Morgenthau, 1967). One 
thing is however clear: America is bent on building a world that is secure, which other 
nations think it is doing from its own perspective and on its own terms; these have been 
the source of the misunderstanding. 
Against this backdrop it is expedient for the US to make more friends and the best way to 
do so is to carry everyone along in its commitment to building a secure world. The 
opportunity of the Summer Fellowship has opened one’s eyes to the soft power, 
benevolence, friendship and humility of America; not all about self interest and arrogance 
that had been the opinion before coming to America. However, how many people of the 
world would know this? The only means is by projecting the great sides through its 
foreign policy. This is more expedient for America to regain global confidence. 
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